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Abstract
Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between
countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables
that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed
and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short
run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-
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independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors
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Explaining de facto judicial independence
1.  Introduction
The notion of the division of powers within the political system can be traced back at
least to Montesquieu. It is argued that each branch of the political system, executive,
legislative and judiciary should be at least partially independent of the two other
branches. It is of special importance to have a judicial body that can solve conflicts
between executive and legislative. A major precondition for the legal system to fulfill
this function is the independence of the judiciary from outside interference. Judicial
independence (JI) can either be measured by looking at the formal laws that define the
position of the judiciary with respect to the other pillars of the political system, which
we call de iure JI. Alternatively, it can be measured by analyzing how JI is factually
implemented, which we term de facto JI.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we show that de iure JI cannot fully explain de
facto JI. Second, we look at other variables that could explain de facto JI.
Recently, it has been found that de facto JI is conducive to economic growth (Feld and
Voigt 2003). Drawing on a new set of indicators, it was also demonstrated that de iure
JI has no significant impact on economic growth. This implies that the correlation
between  de iure and  de facto JI is not perfect. Using data for 80 countries, the
correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.22. In other words: JI as found in
the legal texts is an imperfect predictor for JI as factually implemented. Thus, additional
influences appear to be at work that affect de facto JI.
It is the purpose of this paper to identify variables that determine the level of de facto JI.
A distinction will be made between exogenous factors that cannot be modified, at least
in the short- and medium-term, and factors that can be modified at will even in the short
term. Examples for possibly relevant variables of an exogenous nature are the ethnic
diversity of a society, its religious traditions, and its legal history. Examples for factors
that are – at least in principle – subject to deliberate modification are the number of
political constraints of a political system, the question of whether it is a unitary or a
federal system or what type of court system a country chooses to set up. Such an
approach was chosen because it promises to shed light on the question to which degree
a society has the capacity to establish a judiciary that is not only formally independent
but that is indeed factually so.3
Using a rigorous model reduction process in the empirical analysis, we can show that
five variables appear to be of particular relevance for explaining the level of de facto JI.
De facto JI is increased by de iure JI, confidence of the population in the legal system,
per capita income, political instability, and by parliamentary systems as opposed to
presidential ones.
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section serves to develop some theoretical
considerations, section three contains a description of the data, the fourth section
presents our estimation approach and the results, section five is devoted to an
interpretation of the results, and section six concludes.
2.  Theoretical Considerations
2.1. Judicial Independence
In recent years, interest in the economic consequences of legal rules has burgeoned.
Econometric studies estimating the economic effects of different legal rules were made
possible by a variety of new data sets, representing various aspects of legal rules. The
most prominent data set is probably the Economic Freedom Index as published on an
annual basis by Gwartney et al. (e.g. 2001; de Haan and Sturm 2000 with an overview
over the econometric studies based on these data). Interest in these issues has, however,
not been restricted to the academic world. Almost all policy-oriented programs of good
governance as, e.g., promoted by the World Bank, have stressed the importance of the
rule of law and an independent judiciary.
Three archetypical situations in which the independent judiciary plays a crucial role can
be distinguished:
(1) In cases of conflict between private parties: If they had voluntarily entered into a
contract and one of the contracting parties believes that the other side hasn’t lived up to
the contract, impartial dispute resolution can be important. As long as both sides expect
the judiciary to be impartial and hence independent from pressure emanating from either
of the contract partners or any other party, they can save on transaction costs while
negotiating their contract. On average, lower transaction costs will lead to more welfare-
enhancing transactions taking place.
(2) In cases of conflict between government and the citizens, the citizens are in need of
an organization that can adjudicate who is right (who has acted according to the law) –4
the judiciary. This does not only mean to ascertain the constitutionality of newly passed
legislation but also to check whether the representatives of the state have followed the
procedural devices that are to safeguard the rule of law.
(3) In cases of conflict between various government branches. In the absence of an
impartial arbiter, conflicts between government branches are most likely to develop into
simple power games. An independent judiciary can keep them within the rules laid out
in the constitution.
Recently, two new indicators measuring  de iure as well as  de facto JI have been
presented (Feld and Voigt 2003). For simplicity reasons, these indicators measure the
independence of the highest court of a country, no matter whether it is a supreme court
or a constitutional court. In many states, the judiciary is made up of thousands of
decision-makers and, therefore, radical simplification is necessary. The focus on the
highest court seems warranted because even though judges are personally independent,
the ultimate control of court decisions lies with the highest courts, as they review – on
the initiative of the parties involved – the lower court decisions. The independence of
the highest court thus seems crucial.
Secondly, these indicators are constructed as objective as opposed to subjective
indicators. A subjective indicator of JI would ask for the perception of independence
amongst those being polled. For those who live under the respective rules, their
perception is surely an important element determining their behavior. However, the
norms of what an ideally independent judiciary would look like will most likely be
different in different parts of the world. Data obtained by polls are thus not easily
comparable. The two new indicators are therefore based on factual information. In
principle, anybody re-estimating JI in the countries covered should end up with exactly
the same data.
The indicator measuring de iure JI contains twelve variables, the indicator measuring de
facto JI eight. The de iure indicator includes variables such as the modus of nominating
or appointing highest judges, their term lengths, the possibility of re-appointment, the
procedure of removing them from office, their pay and possible measures against
reduction of their income, the accessibility of the court, the question of whether there is
a general rule allocating cases to specific judges, and publication requirements
concerning the decisions of the court. The de facto indicator includes variables such as
the effective average term lengths, the number of times judges have been removed from
office since 1960, the question of whether their income has remained at least constant in5
real terms since 1960, the size of the budget of the court, and the number of cases in
which the relevant articles of the constitution were changed as well as the number of
times in which other government branches remained inactive when their action was
necessary in order to implement a court ruling.
All variables can take on values between 0 and 1. The sum of the variables is then
divided by the number of variables for which information is available. One thus ends up
with two variables (de iure and de facto JI) that can lie between 0 and 1. By now, data
are available for about 80 countries (aggregate data for both the de iure and the de facto
indicator can be found in the appendix).
Feld and Voigt (2003) find that while de iure JI does not have an impact on economic
growth, de facto JI positively influences real GDP per capita growth in a sample of 56
countries. The impact of de facto JI on economic growth is robust to outliers, to the
inclusion of several additional economic, legal and political control variables and to the
construction of the index. The authors thus conclude that judicial independence matters
for economic growth.
In this paper, we are interested in explaining the observed levels of de facto JI. On an
abstract level, it is easy to think up reasons for the non-congruence between de iure and
de facto JI. Members of constitutional conventions as well as legislatures have
incentives to present to their populations modern, state-of-the-art constitutions that
make the separation of powers concrete by, inter alia, providing for an independent
judiciary. They might also want to please potential foreign investors as well as
international donor agencies and development aid agencies. An additional factor in
many less developed states could also be their Western consultants who recommend an
independent judiciary for plausible reasons, some of which were mentioned above.
Concerning the de facto level, implementation of court rulings can at times be costly for
governments. Court decisions might force them to change their policies in ways they
would prefer to avoid. It can thus be in their (short-term) interest not to follow decisions
or to use other means to make the court decide in ways favorable to them. Hence, we
are interested in identifying the factors that can make politicians respect the level of
judicial independence formally granted in the constitution and other laws if they are
tempted time and again to renege upon it. It is easy to reframe the question in economic
terminology: what factors can make it so costly for politicians to renege upon JI that the
expected net utility will turn out to be negative? As already mentioned in the6
introduction, two possible groups of factors will be dealt with here, one group
consisting of factors that can be modified and set at will, and another group of factors
largely beyond the control of politicians. We first deal with a number of potentially
relevant factors for policy.
A government will refrain from reneging upon judicial independence if this threatens to
be costly. Broad opposition can be costly to the government; yet, the production of
opposition is costly itself. Opposition can take on many forms, such as to be criticized
in parliament, in the press, by mass demonstrations, or disobedience that can even end
with the overthrow of a government. It can thus vary in its costliness to government.
Opposition is a public good and the free rider problem is therefore relevant. If informal
institutions are to help in factually enforcing formally granted judicial independence,
they must enable a sufficiently large number of citizens to make voluntary contributions
to the production of the public good opposition. Before the problem of spontaneously
producing opposition can even become an issue, the population would have to solve the
problem of identifying attempts of tinkering with judicial independence in the first
place. The media as watchdogs might play a substantial role here. One of the hypotheses
to be developed below will indeed inquire into its role.
Intuitively, it seems much more likely that the public good "opposition" can be
produced by organized groups who have already managed to solve the problem of
collective action (Olson 1965), possibly for reasons entirely unrelated to making a
government stay within the confines of the letter of the law. Before discussing the role
of organized groups, we turn to the possible relevance of individual attitudes - and
subsequent behavior – for a high degree of de facto JI. It is argued that some individual
attitudes are more conducive to voluntarily participating in the production of the public
good opposition than others. We will now try to identify some of them.
Relevant parts of the population need to be convinced that it is not fate that is
responsible for their lot, but - at least to some degree - their individual actions. If that is
not the case, no relevant opposition can be expected when its production is needed in
order to safeguard judicial independence. The government’s tinkering with judicial
independence will then be interpreted as fate and the production of opposition as
pointless. The next section discusses under which conditions production of the public
good opposition seems likely. Notice that there is a direct link between individual
attitudes and abilities to resolve the problem of collective action: In order to become
active, individuals need to be convinced that their action can make a difference. Suitable7
individual attitudes are thus a necessary condition for collective action and the
production of opposition.
As has been mentioned, it seems plausible to suppose that it is easier for organized
groups than for unorganized individuals to oppose government in case it reneges on the
contents of the constitution because organized groups have already solved the problem
of collective action. However, the production of opposition remains a public good and
the conditions under which it can be beneficial for an organized group to participate in
its provision must be specified. We would expect a country with a large number of
voluntary associations – or an active civil society – to be able to produce opposition
more easily and thus make government stay within the confines of written law.
We now present our hypotheses individually. We begin with the variables that can – at
least in principle – be influenced by government and then turn to those that are exempt
from direct government intervention.
2.2 Explanatory Variables Influenceable by Deliberate Action
The factual implementation of formal rules cannot be taken for granted. Supposedly, an
intelligent institutional design can, however, improve the degree to which formal legal
rules are factually implemented.
Checks and balances might be the most straightforward example: actors who control
other actors have an incentive to monitor the actions of these other actors and make
them remain within the constitutionally agreed upon boundaries since any transgression
will reduce the competence of some other actor. Recently, it has been proposed to make
the degree of checks and balances measurable by counting the number of veto players
found in a political system (Henisz 2000). Beck et al. (2000) recently proposed a similar
measure. Both measures are used alternatively here.
1
Closely related to the number of veto players is the question of whether one is dealing
with a parliamentary or a presidential system. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) have
recently argued that presidential systems experience more instability than parliamentary
                                                
1  The same hypothesis can be developed from a functional point of view: the more veto players
there are, the higher the probability that they will encounter conflicting interpretations of their
competences and the higher the necessity of a judiciary that can adjudicate between them. Functional
explanations have, however, been met with scepticism by economists and are often rather fallacies than
explanations (see, e.g., Elster 1984).8
ones. They argue that the executive enjoys relatively more power in presidential
systems. Hence, the rich would be threatened by redistribution. We include a variable
here that distinguishes between presidential and parliamentary systems based on the
Database on Political Institutions (DPI) which was provided by Beck et al. (2000).
A third possible determinant, also closely related to the first one, is the question of
whether one is dealing with a unitary or a federal system. The functional argument just
developed with regard to the number of veto players also applies to this variable.
Federal systems have a larger number of veto players than unitary ones and we would
c.p. expect a higher degree of de facto JI in federal than in unitary states. Unfortunately,
it is notoriously difficult to “measure” the degree of federalism of a given political
system. Treisman (2000) contains a dummy variable on federalism which is based on
Elazar (1995) and Riker (1964). This variable is used here.
Another formal variable that could affect de facto JI is the organizational structure of
the court system. It is closely related to the variable “origin of the legal system” a
variable that will be dealt with in the next subsection. Whereas the origin of the legal
system is not subject to deliberate choice, the court system can be chosen. Among the
various possibilities to proxy for the court system, we opted for looking at the chosen
model of constitutional review. The judicial independence data are based on the highest
court of a country, and the system of constitutional review is on an equally high level.
Given that a constitutional system provides for constitutional review (which has only
become the norm during the second half of the 20
th century; Great Britain and the
Netherlands still do not have it), three models can be distinguished: (i) the American
model in which all courts have the competence to deal with constitutional matters; there
is thus no specialized court, constitutional review is a posteriori, and the uniformity of
jurisdiction is secured by the highest court of the country (in the U.S. the Supreme
Court). (ii) the Austrian model as proposed by Hans Kelsen (1920) in which a
specialized constitutional court deals with constitutional matters. It can entail both
abstract and concrete review, as well as a posteriori and  a priori  review. (iii) The
French model in which constitutional matters are dealt with by a special body (e.g. the9
Conseil Constitutionel in France) having primarily a preventive task (Harutyunayn and
Mavcic 1999).
2
There is no clear-cut hypothesis concerning the effects of the various systems. We
include this variable primarily to learn whether one of the three systems has definitive
advantages over the others in factually implementing judicial independence.
3
A free press is hypothesized to be conducive to a high degree of de facto JI. Strictly
speaking, a free press is not part of the relevant institutional structure, but rather a
consequence of a certain institutional structure. If politicians consider tinkering with the
independence of the judiciary, a press that is largely free from government interference
can make such attempts costly – and hence less attractive – for politicians by widely
reporting them. At times, a free press can be instrumental for helping those opposed to
the interference into the independence of the judiciary to overcome their collective
action problems. The indicator used here is provided by Freedom House on an annual
basis and takes into account aspects such as whether or not dissent is allowed, whether
there is political pressure on the content of the media no matter whether state run or
privately owned, whether there is economic influence on media content that would
distort the quality of reporting, and whether there have been any incidents in which
press freedom was violated such as murders, arrests, suspension and the like.
2.3 Explanatory Variables Non-Influenceable by Deliberate Action
An alignment of  de facto with  de iure JI will be more likely if it is costly for
government members to break the rules regarding formal JI. Informal variables
conducive to a high degree of de facto JI are those that help to make the production of
opposition more likely. Such production will be more likely if a large part of the
population shares basic values and norms but also has a similar perception regarding
specific events. We hypothesize that a population split into a number of different ethnic
groups and possibly also speaking different languages will have more difficulty to
produce opposition. A high degree of fractionalization should thus lead to lower levels
of de facto JI.
                                                
2  Most, but not all, constitutional systems can be grouped into one of the three models presented.
Additionally, Harutyanayn and Mavcic (1999) name a “New (British) Commonwealth Model”
implemented by Mauritius, and a “Mixed (American Continental) Model” which can be found in a
number of states, inter alia in Portugal, Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru.10
A counter-argument against this hypothesis can be put forward from a functionalist
perspective: If the judiciary is interpreted as having an arbitration function, the need for
arbitration in fractionalized societies is higher than in homogeneous ones. Yet, if this is
the case, the stakes of controlling the judiciary are high and also the incentives to
change the degree of de facto JI.
Various indicators to measure ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization have been
proposed. The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) is based on data from
1960 compiled by the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological
Committee of the USSR in 1964. The decisive criterion for separating groups was
linguistic origin; no economic or political variables were taken into consideration.
Based on these data, the ELF was calculated by Taylor and Hudson (1972). It measures
the probability that two persons from a given country selected at random do not belong
to the same ethnolinguistic group. The higher the index, the more heterogeneous the
country.
The ELF is not the only indicator that has been proposed to proxy for heterogeneity.
Easterly and Levine (1997) have constructed a variable “Average ethnolinguistic
fractionalization” based on the ELF as well as on four additional indicators. These
include (1) the probability that two randomly selected individuals speak different
languages (Muller 1964), (2) the probability that two randomly selected individuals do
not speak the same language (Roberts 1962), (3) the percentage of the population that
does not speak the official language (Gunnemark 1991), and (4) the percentage of the
population that does not speak the most widely used language (ibid.). The partial
correlation coefficient between the original indicator and the average indicator is high
(0.92). Yet, we decided to use the average indicator as an alternative variable for
heterogeneity because it is available for a larger number of countries.
Different religions can lead to different values, norms, and attitudes. Max Weber
(1920/1988) famously argued that the secondary virtues propagated by Protestant sects
led to a work ethic that was conducive to economic growth. Religions can propagate the
importance of individual attitudes, decisions, and actions with regard to the good life.
The other extreme is the case in which everything is predetermined and beyond the
                                                                                                                                              
3  It would also be interesting to check whether the division of labor within the court system has
any discernible effect on de facto JI.11
control of the individual. Such views would be conducive to fatalism in which actions
directed against the state would not even come to anybody’s mind.
Putnam (1993) claims that those Italian regions with a high number of voluntary
associations that have a horizontal organization structure are conducive to the
production of high quality local public goods. He further argues that the Catholic
Church has a vertical organization structure. La Porta et al. (1997) asked whether this
result could be generalized and additionally classified Islam and the various Orthodox
churches as having hierarchical structures. They find (ibid., 336f.) that holding per
capita income constant, “countries with more dominant hierarchical religions have less
efficient judiciaries, greater corruption, lower-quality bureaucracies, higher rates of tax
evasion, lower rates of participation in civic activities and professional associations, a
lower level of importance of large firms in the economy, inferior infrastructures, and
higher inflation.”
Another – closely related – aspect is the relationship between religion and state. It has
been argued (e.g. by Berman 1983, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986) that competing
jurisdictions between state and church were one decisive factor for the West to grow
rich. Inversely, caesaropapism – the unity of state and church leadership – is
conjectured to be a hindrance to implementing the rule of law and an independent
judiciary as a part thereof. This hypothesis is based on the conjecture that the church
and the state offer different legal systems that compete for loyalty. Competition would
secure that the preferences of the subjects would have to be taken into account more
closely than in a setting in which an all-powerful state is the monopoly supplier. The
orthodox churches represent the religions most closely connected to caesaropapism.
Religious traditions will have an influence on attitudes and behavior even in largely
secularized societies. Yet, there might be other factors influencing behavior. We thus
decided to construct a variable capturing what could be called “rule of law culture”, a
set of attitudes that we hypothesize to be conducive to the rule of law – and to a high
degree of de facto JI. This indicator is based on three waves of the World Values Survey
(1981, 1990, and 1995-97). About 1000 randomly selected people in about 50 different
countries and regions were asked a multitude of questions concerning values and
attitudes (see World Values Study Group 2000).
Our first indicator is based on the answers to a question asking about the confidence the
respondents have in the legal system. This gives an indication of the informal support12
the judiciary has in the population. Strong public support may not only help to
guarantee that the codified extent of de iure JI is actually implemented, it may actually
increase the degree of JI.
4 However, the direction of causation is not entirely clear. It
might also be the case that high de facto JI increases the confidence of the population in
the legal system. If that is the case, our coefficient estimates on this variable will be
biased upward.
It was shown that the production of opposition is equivalent to the production of a
public good. In case government threatens to undermine JI, a population’s capacity to
produce opposition is therefore subject to its capacity to overcome the problem of
collective action. Some variables from the World Values Survey can be used as proxies
for individual attitudes that are a precondition for becoming actively involved in public
issues. Since they are not directly measuring what we are interested in, we construct a
variable containing that part of the variance of the respective variables we are actually
interested in when measuring the potential for collective action. Distilling the
information of several variables into one is also advantageous in the present situation of
a scarcity of degrees of freedom. We use three such variables to generate a factor
“Collective Action” by using principle components analysis:
(1)  Survey respondents were given a list of 15 different types of voluntary
organizations (from social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived
people via sports organizations and women’s groups to animal rights) and they
could indicate (i) whether they belonged to any of these and (ii) whether they
actively participated in them. Answers to both questions are of interest here: the
existence of voluntary organizations and a high membership rate indicate that
people in a specific society have managed to overcome the problem of
collective action before.
(2)  Respondents were asked whether they have complete control over their lives.
Those who think that they do not have much control are less likely to believe in
the possibilities of collective action.
(3)  Finally, a questioned inquired whether respondents thought that their country
was run by a few big interests. Again, a higher percentage of people believing
                                                
4  A similar argument related to central bank independence has been made by Hayo (1998).13
that this is the case will make it less likely that collective actions are undertaken,
as people feel powerless.
A principle component analysis based on these three variables is run and generates a
factor that explains 39% of the variance in the underlying variables. The signs of the
factor loadings are as suggested above and all are above the rule-of-thumb value of 0.5.
This factor is computed for every country, which makes its absolute value comparable
in the cross-section analysis conducted below. A high positive value indicates that the
country has a relatively good potential for solving the collective action problem.
A related variable, but kept separately, as it did not load very highly on the above factor,
is based on whether people think that their country should be run by technocrats. JI can
also be interpreted as technocratic governance, since judges are usually not directly
accountable for their actions to the electorate. A hypothesis based on this observation
would argue that in societies which accept technocratic governance more readily, JI
should be higher.
Finally, the next variable is of a rather indirect type: Survey participants were asked
whether, generally speaking, most people in society could be trusted. Both Banfield
(1958) and Putnam (1993) have stressed the importance of trust for the possibility to co-
operate voluntarily. Trust is here interpreted as the consequence of norms of reciprocity
that can develop out of horizontally structured interaction situations. A high degree of
trust should thus be conducive to the possibility to overcome the collective action
problem.
Of late, a number of authors have argued that the legal origin of a country’s commercial
law has far-reaching effects. On a first level, La Porta et al. (1998) distinguish between
common and civil law. Within the civil law tradition, they distinguish between the
French, the German, and the Scandinavian law families. After having added socialist
legal systems, all countries taken into account in La Porta et al. (1999) are grouped into
one of these five traditions.
5 It can, of course, be questioned whether the origin of the
commercial code of a country should have any influence on the degree of factually
observable judicial independence. But La Porta et al. (1998, 1141) find that the quality
of law enforcement differs across legal families. To proxy for the quality of law
                                                
5  It is unclear whether the Central and Eastern European countries should be coded as „socialist“
or according to the more traditional influences according to which the Czech Republic and Hungary
should, e.g., be coded as belonging to the German family.14
enforcement, they take variables such as “efficiency of the judicial system” as provided
by Business International Corp., “rule of law”, “Corruption”, “risk of expropriation”,
and “repudiation of contracts by government” all provided by the International Country
Risk Guide. Here, the Scandinavian countries are on top, with countries having a
German civil-law tradition following closely behind. Common law-countries are behind
these two groups but ahead of countries belonging to the French tradition.
The simple legal origin hypothesis has been attacked by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard
(2003) who argue that the way the law was initially transplanted and received is a more
important determinant than the affiliation to a particular legal family. They claim that
the origin of a legal system as identified by La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) might be a good
predictor for what we call de iure legality, but not for the factual implementation of the
law. For de facto legality, the way the law was transformed according to the specific
situation of a society, whether it was imported voluntary or enforced by a colonial
power and so forth would be much more important. According to their findings,
countries that have developed legal orders internally, or adapted transplanted legal
orders to local conditions, and (or) had a population that was already familiar with basic
legal principles of the transplanted law have more effective legality than countries that
received foreign law without any similar pre-dispositions. Berkowitz et al. (2003) deal
with commercial law. Their basic hypothesis does, however, coincide nicely with
similar hypotheses that have been developed with regard to a society’s constitutions
(Voigt 1998): if it is not in accordance with the values, norms, and attitudes of a society,
it is most likely not going to be enforced. For lack of an indicator that would represent
the transplant effect with regard to constitutional law, we simply check whether the
voluntariness/receptiveness of passing commercial law has effects on the degree of
judicial independence factually observed.
Another variable that cannot be influenced ex post is the time that has passed since the
Constitution of a country has come into force. With regard to the credibility of central
banks, Blinder (2000, 1427) recently noted that “(i)n contrast to some naïve
interpretations of rational expectations, in which credibility can be created or destroyed
abruptly by, say, announcing or legislating an institutional change, our respondents
believe that a consistent track record matters most for credibility.” To assess the claim
that the past matters for how JI is evaluated by citizens and other potential investors, we15
include the date a constitution came into force. A government – or more broadly: a
regime – will not be able to build up a reputation as law-abiding or JI-respecting
overnight.
6
The stability of a political system is closely related with the time the respective
constitution has been in place. A formal political system can be radically changed in a
day. Implementation of radical change will, however, often take years. Whether a
formally highly independent judiciary will in fact turn out to become independent will
only show after a number of years. Our de facto indicator does take this into account.
One can thus assume that political stability should be conducive to de facto JI. To
measure political stability we have used the riots indicator provided by Easterly and
Levine (1997).
7
Finally, there is the issue of influencing judges via bribery. In general, if corruption is a
widely practiced and accepted form of social and economic interaction, then it may also
affect the supreme court. In particular, a corrupt executive may try to undermine the
separation of powers within the political system by influencing judges using many
forms of bribery. Hence, if politicians are corrupt, the de facto independence of judges
may be lower than their de iure position. However, if corruption is a more general
problem of a society, we might see the opposite effect: societies may support the
jurisdiction over and above its formal role in the division of power to keep corruption
somehow at bay. In the empirical analysis, we include the mean corruption index
reflecting the general level of corruption in a country, as well as an indicator based on
the WVS that concentrates on the respondent’s assessment of political corruption in
their country.
2.4 Some Control Variables
A priori, it is not clear whether good institutions lead to higher incomes or whether
higher incomes enable societies to “afford” good institutions (see, e.g., Chong and
Caldéron 2000). It has therefore become common practice to control for the log of GNP
per capita.
                                                
6  This is reflected in the construction of the index of de facto JI: some variables cover the period
between 1960 and today. Regime changes will thus not lead to an immediate change in the index values.16
Another factor that might influence the results is geography. Often, dummy variables
for Africa (and other continents) are used but we decided to take the latitude of a
country into account based on the observation that economies in more temperate zones
have a number of advantages such as less health problems, better conditions for
agriculture and – possibly – less natural disasters.
3.  Data description
Although for some variables we have many more observations, due to missing data
constructing a consistent data set containing the variables of interest results in a
maximum of 46 cases. The sample is not necessarily a representative sample neither of
the world population nor of the geographic location of countries. The data do cover all
regions in the world, though (see Table 1):
Table 1: Regional breakdown of available observations








African countries are very much underrepresented, while European and South American
countries are over-represented.
Reflecting the theoretical discussion above, we consider the following variables in our
analysis (see Table 2):
                                                                                                                                              
7  A possible counterargument would be that high stability could also mean stability of a dependent
judiciary.17
Table 2: Information on variables
Variable Source Coding Corre-
lation
Sample
DE FACTO JI Feld and Voigt (2003) Continuous between 0 and 1. 0, 1
DE IURE JI Feld and Voigt (2003) Continuous between 0 and 1. 0.22 0, 1
LEGAL
CONFIDENCE
World Value Survey Average of individual level coding ranging
from 2: very much confidence, 1, -1, to –2:
non at all (see the Appendix for original
wording in survey).
0.19 0, 1
LOENGL La Porta et al. (1998) Dummy (1, 0). -0.01 1
LOFREN La Porta et al. (1998) Dummy (1, 0). -0.02 1
LOGERM La Porta et al. (1998) Dummy (1, 0). 0.34 1
LOSCAN La Porta et al. (1998) Dummy (1, 0). 0.06 1
LOSOCI La Porta et al. (1998) Dummy (1, 0). -0.27 1
PROTESTANT La Porta et al. (1998) Share in %. 0.15 1
CATHOLIC La Porta et al. (1998) Share in %. -0.07 1
MUSLIM La Porta et al. (1998) Share in %. -0.08 1
ORTHOD CIA World Fact Book Share in %. -0.09 1
OTHER La Porta et al. (1998) Share in %. 0.09 1
LATITUDE La Porta et al. (1998) Actual latitude. 0.20 1
LOG GNP PER
CAPITA
La Porta et al. (1998) Log of per capita GNP. 0.38 0, 1
AVELF Easterly and Levine (1997) Average ethnolinguistic fractionalization. -0.03 1
CORRUPTION MCI Index (2001) Mean of corruption index (higher values
imply lower corruption).
0.44 1
POLCONIII Henisz (2000) Number of independent branches of
government with veto power over policy
change.
0.12 1
FEDERALISM Elazar (1995) Dummy (1, 0). -0.01 1
CHECKS Beck et al. (2000) Number of institutions that provide
legislative “checks”.
0.001 1
TRUST World Value Survey National average of answer to question
“Can people be trusted?”, originally coded





Freedom House Coding 0: no press freedom to 100:
Maximum press freedom.
-0.31 1
DATE Various sources Year when constitution came into force. -0.20 2
POLCONV Henisz (2000) Same as POLCONIII (see above) but also
including the judiciary and sub-federal
units.
0.27 2
US COURT Harutyunyan and Mavcic
(1999)





Dummy (1, 0). 0.29 2
MIXED COURT Harutyunyan and Mavcic
(1999)
Dummy (1, 0). 0.18 2
FRENCH COURT Harutyunyan and Mavcic
(1999)
Dummy (1, 0). -0.04 2
STABILITY Easterly and Levine (1997) Number of violent demonstrations




Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance





Presidential system, Dummy (1, 0). -0.51 218
POLCORRUPT World Value Survey National average of answer to question
“Importance of political corruption?”,
originally coded (1: not important, 2, 3, 4:
very important), lower values imply higher
corruption. See Appendix for original
wording in survey.
-0.39 3
TECHNOCRAT World Value Survey National average of answer to question
“Should technocrats run the country?”,
originally coded (1: not important, 2, 3, 4:





World Value Survey Factor estimated using principle
component analysis using answers on
“Active voluntary organization
membership?”, “Complete control over
one’s own life?”, and “Country run by a
few big interests?”. See Appendix for
original wording in survey.
-0.01 3
Notes: Correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the variable in the row and de facto JI
using the maximum number of observations in the sample. Sample 0 contains 46 cases, Sample 1 contains
39 cases, Sample 2 contains 30 cases, and Sample 3 contains 20 cases. The full list of countries is given in
the Appendix.
4.  Explaining de facto Legal Independence in a Multivariate Setting
In view of the theoretical discussion above, we cannot get many empirically relevant
restrictions over and above the choice of variables that should be included in our model.
However, we think that special emphasis needs to be placed on avoiding spurious
relationships. Therefore, our modeling strategy is general-to-specific, as advocated by
Hendry (1993). This strategy ensures that the inferences are statistically valid. Since we
have quite a number of potentially influential variables, there is the danger that our final
parsimonious model is not an encompassing model, as inference may be path
dependent. Based on the re-examination of the vices and virtues of data mining by
Hoover and Perez (1999), Hendry and Krolzig (1999) develop a model reduction
algorithm, that, according to a wide range of Monte-Carlo studies, is surprisingly
powerful in recovering the underlying data generating process (DGP). We apply this
approach to the problem at hand.
There is a further complication in the present analysis, as not all variables are available
for the same number of cases. The empirical strategy needs to be adjusted if we want to
take into account the available indicators for all influences discussed in the theoretical
section. We do general-to-specific estimation and testing for three data sets. The first
data set contains variables that are available for at least 39 cases. We then apply19
general-to-specific modeling to derive a specific model. This model is then used as a
base model in the other two sample sizes. The second data set contains 30 cases and we
add other indicators to the base model and pursue a consistent testing-down process.
Finally, we use a data set of 20 cases and perform a similar analysis.
The general unrestricted model for the biggest data set includes all variables as
indicated in Table 1. Statistical tests indicate that it is an acceptable representation of
the DGP, as it does pass tests for heteroscedasticity, normality, Chow-tests for
parameter constancy, and a RESET-test for misspecification. We also check for
collinearity, and find a considerable amount of common variation among the
explanatory variables. The eigenvalues of the second-moment matrix range from 10.8 to
0.0009. Most of the collinearity is between explanatory variables and the constant term.
There is also noteworthy collinearity between the variables de iure JI, GNP per capita,
POLCONIII, latitude, trust, and corruption index. In the testing-down process we make
sure that the specific model is not the result of an excessive influence of collinearity.
The specific model that emerges out of the general-to-specific process is the following
(see Table 3):
Table 3: Sample 1: Specific model for de facto judicial independence (39 cases)
Variables Coeff. Betas SE Instability Part. R
2
Constant -0.807** 0.253 0.20 0.23
DE IURE JI 0.563* 0.31 0.220 0.21 0.16
LEGAL CONFIDENCE 0.284** 0.49 0.081 0.19 0.27
LOG GNP PER CAPITA 0.130** 0.74 0.027 0.22 0.41
PROTESTANT -0.003* -0.31 0.001 0.48* 0.11
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level.
All of the variables remaining in the model are significant at a level of 5% or lower and
they are also jointly significant (see Table 4). Moreover, the excluded variables are
jointly insignificant with respect to the final model. The partial R
2 listed in the last
column of Table 3 indicates that in the final specification, collinearity does not appear
to be a problem, as none of the values is particularly small.
The fit of the equation, measured using both R
2 and adjusted R
2, is not bad for cross-
sectional data. Figure 1 shows actual and predicted values.20
Figure 1: Predicted versus actual values






Do we find any particular outliers in our predicted values? To answer this question, we
estimate the model recursively and evaluate one-step residuals in relation to the standard
error of the regression ( s). Figure 2 presents these residuals bounded by 95%-
confidence bands.
Figure 2: One-step residuals (+/- 2s, approximately 5% significance level)





There is one significant outlier, namely the Czech Republic. We will see below what
happens when we control for this observation.
Table 4 contains the outcome of applying a battery of diagnostic statistics. None of
these indicate any  misspecification, as the model passes tests for  heteroscedasticity
(White (1980) using squares of regressors), normality (Jarque and Bera (1987) with a
small-sample correction), and misspecification (RESET test based on Ramsey (1969)).
When assessing the stability of parameters in a cross-section context, traditional Chow
tests are not particularly helpful, as the order of observations is arbitrary. However, an
alternative test for insample parameter constancy was developed by Hansen (1992). It
tests both variance and coefficients on variables for stability and does not rely on an a21
priori splitting of the sample. Applying this test, we neither find evidence of instability
for the variance of the equation nor for the coefficients as a group (see Table 4). This
procedure can also be used for calculating individual parameter stability tests. Here,
some instability is found for Protestant. Thus, estimates for this variable do not seem to
be very robust.
Table 4: Sample 1: Diagnostic information for specific model (39 cases)
Diagnostic indicator Diagnostic indicator
Testing-down F(15,19) = 0.55 SE equation (s) 0.18
Joint test remaining F(4,34) = 8.7** R
2 0.50
Heteroscedasticity test F(8,25) = 0.48 Adj. R
2 0.45
Normality test Chi
2(2) = 3.2 Instability variance 0.35
RESET test F(1,33) = 0.006 Instability joint 1.68
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level.
For the reduced model presented in Table 3, there are additional observations available.
Re-estimating the model using Sample 0 containing 46 observations reveals that the
influence of Protestant is indeed not robust. It is not significant even at a 10% level
anymore. In addition, we face another outlier from the new observations, Russia. This
may not be entirely surprising, as the quality of the data for some Eastern European
countries is not very good. Controlling for both Czech Republic and Russia and
dropping Protestant, we get the model presented in Table 5:
Table 5: Final model for de facto judicial independence (46 cases)
Variables Coeff. Betas SE Part. R
2
DE IURE JI 0.552** 0.31 0.195 0.17
LEGAL CONFIDENCE 0.205** 0.35 0.065 0.20
LOG GNP PER CAPITA 0.094** 0.49 0.021 0.34
Constant -0.535* 0.210 0.14
Czech Republic Dummy -0.446* -0.27 0.177 0.14
Russia Dummy -0.491* -0.30 0.181 0.16
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level.22
The qualitative results are similar to what we found in Table 3. Table 6 shows that the
diagnostics for this model are fine. Instability tests cannot be computed due to the
presence of the outlier dummies. However, when estimating the model without the
dummies, the tests do not find any instability.
Table 6: Diagnostic information for final model (46 cases)
Diagnostic indicator Diagnostic indicator
Joint test remaining F(5,40) = 9.6** SE equation (s) 0.17
Heteroscedasticity test F(8,31) = 0.54 R
2 0.55
Normality test Chi
2(2) = 0.64 Adj. R
2 0.49
RESET test F(1,39) = 2.17
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level.
To summarize, we have developed a statistically valid reduction of the general model
outlined above. We find that de facto JI is robustly explained by de iure JI, GNP per
capita, and the confidence of the population in the working of the legal system. This
final model survives a wide range of specification tests and can be seen as a credible
base model for extending the analysis by considering additional variables for which less
observations are available.
5.  Explaining de facto Legal Independence Using Other Indicators
In our effort to include other indicators in the explanation of de facto JI, we have to
resort to a smaller sample size. The base model from Table 5 of the previous section
will be enhanced by  DATE, AUSTRIAN COURT, FRENCH COURT, MIXED
COURT, STABILITY, VOTER TURNOUT, POLCONV, SYSPRES. The number of
cases in sample 2 is 30.
The testing down process, conditional on including the variables from the base model,
leads to the results presented in Table 7.23
Table 7: Sample 2: Final model for de facto judicial independence (30 cases)
Variables Coeff. Betas SE Part. R
2
DE IURE JI 0.518** .42 0.144 0.35
LEGAL CONFIDENCE 0.087 .16 0.059 0.09
LOG GNP PER CAPITA 0.076** .45 0.019 0.42
STABILITY 0.022** .35 0.007 0.32
SYSPRES -0.243** -.41 0.053 0.57
Dummy Czech Republic -0.562** -.43 0.134 0.43
Constant -0.42 0.207 0.15
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level.
Of the variables from the base model, only confidence in legal system is not significant.
The constant term is only significant at a 10% level but removing it from the model
would lead to a violation of the reduction test. The stability indicator and the
presidential system variable, on the other hand, are showing highly significant
influences.
Again, the diagnostic statistics are fine, as indicated by Table 8. Note that the fit of the
equation is high for this type of data. The assumption of normally-distributed residuals
would be violated if we did not include the dummy variable for the Czech Republic.
Table 8: Sample 2: Diagnostic information for final model (30 cases)
Diagnostic indicator Diagnostic indicator
Joint test remaining F(6,23) = 13.6** SE equation (s) 0.13
Heteroscedasticity test F(10,12) = 0.44 R
2 0.78
Normality test Chi
2(2) = 0.78 Adj. R
2 0.72
RESET test F(1,22) = 1.76
Notes: An *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) significance level. The use of dummies makes it
impossible to compute the stability tests.
Finally, we look at the remaining variables included in Sample 3, the smallest sample
containing 20 observations. At this stage, we add the degree of political corruption,
attitude towards technocratic governance, and the Factor “collective action potential” to
the base model from Table 5. Since the Czech Republic drops out of the sample, we do
not need the dummy variable here.24
The testing down process eliminates all of these new variables, and only the base model
variables remain significant in the reduced model. An exception is the log of GNP per
capita, which is significant at a 10% level only. This implies that in the interpretation of
our findings in the next section we will refer primarily to the variables listed in Table 7.
6.  Interpretation of Results
Concentrating on the robust influences, that means those variables which survive the
testing down process, the first result of interest is the positive coefficient of the de iure
judicial independence indicator. Hence anchoring JI by formal laws increases actual JI.
What is the meaning of the size of the coefficient? It implies that an increase in the
index value of de iure JI raises de facto JI by 0.55 points. Although the size of the
coefficients is not directly comparable, if actual JI were fully explainable by written
laws then we would expect that the elasticity of de iure with respect to de facto JI is
one. Computing this elasticity at the means of de facto and de iure JI in the sample with
46 cases, we get a value of 0.61. Since the partial derivative has been estimated with
uncertainty and the sample means of these two variables are relatively similar, it is
meaningful to ask whether the coefficient on de iure JI is statistically different from
unity. We can clearly reject this hypothesis at a 5% level (Chi
2(1) = 6.59*). Thus, our
first important result is that there is not a one-to-one relationship between de iure JI and
de facto JI.
The indicator for the confidence in the legal system by the public shows a positive
influence. The higher legal confidence, the more independent will the prime judges be
de facto. Arguably, this supports the point made above, namely that judges can increase
their independence by generating trust about their work in the general populace. Or, put
differently, legal trust can be a substitute for written laws. It should also be noted that
the correlation coefficient between legal confidence and general trust in the society is
significantly positive (0.35). However, the explanatory power of legal confidence is
much higher, as it is more specific to the question at hand than general trust.
Societies with a higher GNP per capita have granted their judges relatively more JI
compared to what is written down in the constitution. This variable reflects the divide in
the world between more and less developed countries. However, this variable is more a25
control variable for factors that we cannot directly measure than a clear explanation of
exactly why there is a difference between de iure and de facto JI.
What about the respective importance of these effects in explaining de facto JI? Given
the different units in which these variables are measured, it is difficult to directly
compare the estimated regression coefficients. However, one can compare the relative
importance of variables within the estimated model using standardized regression
coefficients (betas). In the final model covering the largest sample, displayed in Table 5,
log GNP per capita shows the highest standardized regression coefficient, followed by
confidence in legal system, and de iure JI with the lowest value.
After considering other influences through lowering the sample size, we found
significant effects for the stability of the political system. Greater political instability
raises de facto JI. Thus, if the executive and legislative is threatened by social unrest,
societies are more likely going to ensure that the legal system will be insulated from
political pressures. Moreover, this insulation is not based on formal rules, which could
be easily adjusted after a change in government, but informal rules. This interpretation
is fostered by a comparison of correlation coefficients between instability and de facto
JI (0.22) as well as de iure JI (0.003). It should also be emphasized that this variable
suffers from a sample selection bias. In particular, we do not have observations on
societies exhibiting strong instability. Thus, the above finding really relates only to
moderate degrees of social unrest.
Finally, we find that presidential systems are characterized by a lesser degree of de facto
JI than parliamentary systems. Looking at the correlation coefficients between
presidential systems and de facto JI reveals a weak but positive relationship (0.04). This
may reflect the idea of a separation of powers a la Montesquieu, as generally in a
presidential system the president has much more power than the executive in a
parliamentary system.
8 Judging from the correlation coefficient between presidential
system and de facto JI (-0.51), we find a strong inverse relationship. In other words, the
separation of powers is less successfully implemented in presidential systems than it is
in parliamentary systems. As is apparent from Table 7, this result also holds in the
multivariate case.
                                                
8  In almost all cases in the sample, the president is directly elected by the population. In one case
(South Africa) the president is elected by an assembly. Separating this case from the dummy capturing
presidential systems does not affect the marginal significance level of the presidential dummy very much,
while the a dummy containing South Africa is not significant.26
What about the relative importance of explanatory variables in Table 7? Apart from
confidence in legal system, most of the variables are quite similar in importance. Since
legal confidence is not significant in this sample (marginal significance level of 0.16), it
is interesting to ask why this is the case. When including variables step-by-step, we find
that the dummy for presidential system reduces the explanatory power of legal
confidence. However, computing recursive t-tests using Sample 1, we find that legal
confidence is more significant in the larger sample than in Sample 2. Thus, it seems to
be a combination of both collinearity and differing sample that is responsible for the
insignificance of legal confidence in Table 7.
7.  Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the observation that de iure JI and de facto JI are
imperfectly correlated. Hence our first question was how the factually observed levels
of judicial independence can be explained. The second question dealt with is a
potentially frustrating issue: given that a society’s politicians want to implement a
factually independent judiciary, to what degree is it in their hands to establish it? Asked
differently: to what degree does the observable level of judicial independence depend on
variables beyond the reach of politicians?
18 potentially relevant variables were presented above: out of them, six can be
influenced by deliberate institutional choice, whereas ten of them do not appear to be
directly influenceable. The remaining two variables are control variables. This very
large number of potentially relevant variables was boiled down by using the general-to-
specific approach as developed by Hendry (1993). We find that de facto JI is robustly
explained by  de iure JI (subject to deliberate choice), GNP per capita (a control
variable), and the confidence of the population in the working of the legal system (not
subject to deliberate choice). If a smaller sample size with better data availability is
used, we find that instability (measured by the number of violent demonstrations
involving the use of physical forces) is correlated with higher levels of  de facto JI,
whereas presidential systems (as compared to parliamentary ones) are correlated with
lower levels of de facto JI.
On the basis of the analyzed samples, de facto JI is thus influenced by at least some
variables that are subject to deliberate choice, in particular de iure JI and parliamentary27
versus presidential system. Given that de facto JI is important for economic growth and
development, this is good news. The confidence of the population in the legal system is
not a variable easily within the reach of the political reformer. This variable reflects the
trust of the population in the working of the judiciary and it is likely that its build-up
needs a long-time perspective. There is also the issue that legal trust may be boosted by
the de facto JI, and that the two variables are in some sort of positive feedback loop.
9
These results should, however, be read with some caution. First, a number of variables
that one would classify as important influences on de facto JI, for example the factor
“collective action”, turn out to be insignificant. As these variables are only available for
a rather small number of countries, we may simply be lacking enough observations to
disentangle their effects. Thus, it is a desideratum to construct indicators for the other
theoretically relevant variables that are available for the entire sample size. Secondly,
the data for de iure as well as de facto JI are not beyond any doubt. Currently, a second
wave of data gathering is under way. After its conclusion, we will know more about the
precision of the data.
Finally, more research concerning the transformation mechanisms that drive the results
is certainly necessary. To name but one example: why is it that higher GNP per capita is
correlated with higher levels of  de facto  JI? What is the actual cause behind this
correlation?
                                                
9 See Hayo (1998) for a similar argument relating to inflation aversion in the population and central bank
independence.28
Appendix
List of countries in samples
Country Sample Country Sample
Argentina 0, 1, 2, 3 Lithuania 0
Australia 0, 1, 3 Mexico 0, 1, 2, 3
Austria 0, 1, 2, 3 Netherlands 0, 1,
Bangladesh 0, 1, 2, 3 Nigeria 0, 1,
Belgium 0, 1, 2 Pakistan 0, 1, 2
Brazil 0, 1, 2 Peru 0, 1, 2, 3
Bulgaria 0, 1, 2, 3 Philippines 0, 1, 2, 3
Chile 0, 1, 2, 3 Portugal 0, 1, 2
China 0, 1, Russia 0
Colombia 0, 1, 2, 3 Slovakia 0
Croatia 0 Slovenia 0
Czech 0, 1, 2 South Africa 0, 1, 2, 3
Denmark 0, 1, 2 Spain 0, 1, 2
Estonia 0 Sweden 0, 1, 2, 3
Finland 0, 1, 2, 3 Switzerland 0, 1, 2, 3
France 0, 1, 2 Taiwan 0, 1,
Georgia 3 Turkey 0, 1, 2, 3
Ghana 0, 1, 2 UK 0, 1,
Hungary 0, 1, 2 Ukraine 0
Iceland 0, 1, Uruguay 0, 1, 3
India 0, 1, 2, 3 USA 0, 1, 2, 3
Italy 0, 1, 2 Venezuela 0, 1,
Japan 0, 1, 2 W-Germany 0, 1, 2, 3
Korea, South 0, 1, 2
Notes: Sample 0: 46 cases, Sample 1: 39 cases, Sample 2: 30 cases, and Sample 3: 20
cases.29
World Value Survey
Primary data were obtained from the “Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung” in
Cologne. Waves are 1981-84, 1990-93, and 1995-97. When several years of data on the
same question are available for a country, arithmetic averages were used in the analysis.
Original wording of questions
LEGAL CONFIDENCE
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed [here the legal system], how
much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none
at all?
TRUST
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be
too careful in dealing with people?
•  Most people can be trusted
•  Can't be too careful [TRANSLATION: ="have to be very careful"]
•  Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]
POLCORRUPT
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
•  Almost no public officials are engaged in it
•  A few public officials are engaged in it
•  Most public officials are engaged in it
•  Almost all public officials are engaged in it
•  DK
TECHNOCRAT
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about
each as a way of governing this country. For each one [here: Having experts, not
government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country], would
you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this
country?
Questions used for constructing factor “COLLECTIVE ACTION”
Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking
out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
•  Run by a few big interests
•  Run for all the people
•  Don't know [DO NOT READ OUT]30
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell
me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type
of organization? Categories: Active member, Inactive member or Don' t belong.
•  Church or religious organization
•  Sport or recreation organization
•  Art, music or educational organization
•  Labor union
•  Political party
•  Environmental organization
•  Professional association
•  Charitable organization
•  Any other voluntary organization
Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while
other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please
use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how
much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.31
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